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early Vedic belief perhaps a little more than some scholars have lately done. This is doubtless well; for, in the tendency to treat Zoroastrianism as specifically Iranian, we sometimes lose sight of the other side a little more than is proper. It must be remembered, however, that there is a great gulf in general between the two religions as far as certain beliefs are concerned. It should here be noted that Zarathushtra (not Zarathustra) is the proper spelling of the prophet's name. What is said on the ethical teachings of Brahmanism (pp. 202-204) is worth looking up. The closing chapters on the modern Hindu sects, on certain religious traits of the native wild tribes of India, and upon India and the West are instructive and interesting; a very serviceable classified bibliography (pp. 573-595), moreover, and a useful index add to the value of an already valuable work.

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BUDDHISM: ITS HISTORY AND LITERATURE. By T. W. Rhys Davids, LL.D., Ph.D. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896.

To say that this new book contains nothing new is not to cast a slight upon its value. The author is a well-known scholar, who, in his "Manual of Buddhism," has already expressed, more fully and more satisfactorily, his views in regard to some of the fundamental questions of Buddhism. "Buddhism" itself gives again the old material in more superficial form. Presented first in the shape of popular lectures (the first "American Lectures on the History of Religions"), these six chapters recapitulate the chief points in the life and doctrine of Buddha, as they have been made known to us in late years by the Pâli texts. Mr. Davids's easy colloquial style (not, unfortunately, quite free from instances of rather questionable English) makes the Lectures pleasant reading, and the general public, for whom they are intended, may rely upon the accuracy of their guide in the presentation of facts. Especially is this the case in the exposition of Buddhism itself (Lectures ii. and iii.). More questionable material is presented in the introductory chapter on pre-Buddhistic thought, the author being here quite out of his depth, notably in the antiquated opinions held by him in regard to the "childlike" character of the early Vedic poets, and in the somewhat careless jumbling of early Vedic and late philosophical ideas. It is not to be wondered at that, in the elucidation

of Buddhistic eschatology, Mr. Davids still holds the simple, if not altogether convincing, dogma that Nirvâna has nothing to do with the next life, but that it connotes merely the idea of earthly happiness attained by him who has extinguished lust and passion. For the author himself was the first to substitute this explanation for the older one, which held that Nirvâna meant either psychic extinction or the post-mortem bliss of eternal peace. It is only to be regretted that he presents it here as the only explanation, for in the early Buddhistic works there are many passages which will not admit this definition of Nirvâna. It is, indeed, evident to the historical scholar that Nirvâna had several meanings, and that it was variously interpreted. Buddha himself was not only a deist; he was a nihilist. To him there was no hereafter for the good and perfect man. Only the ignorant, the sinful, the weak lived hereafter, their prolonged life being the penalty of their prolonged sin and ignorance. The "blowing out," *nirvâna*, of passion, was to such men identical with extinction of life. But in Buddha's public teaching all the weight was laid upon the former, none upon the latter point. It is this that makes clearly and unmistakably the difference between Brahmanism and Buddhism. The former, in one way or another, always remained theistic and deistic. The latter accepted the belief in gods as evanescent phenomena, but renounced entirely the belief in a Supreme Deity. For prayer and penance it substituted a high moral life and temperance in the literal sense. Buddha both abjured asceticism and preached against excess. It was this doctrine which, enforced by the wonderful eloquence and personal magnetism of the great teacher, took so strong a hold upon the minds and hearts of his hitherto priest-ridden countrymen. Strange that this teacher himself, in the degraded faith of later days, should become not only the inculcator of the very doctrine he abhorred, but the image of God on earth! If Buddhism has any permanent value, and our author is quite correct in intimating very strongly that it has, this value lies not in its dogma, but in the historical lesson to be learned by the rise and fall of this faith in India. For Buddhism owes its success to the fact that, for a dry theistic religion, which had become mere ritual, it substituted a fervent morality. Each man was made the fabricator of his own fortune; the divine element, the psychic element, were both eliminated from ethics. This was taught as a saving faith together with the then new doctrine that every man was the fellow of his brother man, and that he owed it to his brother, no

matter of what caste, to preach the new gospel of brotherly love and human sufficiency. The fall of Buddhism is not less instructive. The later church forgot the teacher's teaching. Gorgeous rites became the sign of religion ; metaphysics took the place of morality ; the founder of the faith himself became God in human form ; and Buddhism became a mere superstition, long moribund and at last extinct in India, living only in the meretricious garb of superstition in foreign lands. There is enough here to make Buddhism valuable as a study even to-day.

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PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1894-95. *First Series.* By Alexander Campbell Fraser, LL.D., Hon. D.C.L. Oxford, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1895. Pp. 303.

It may seem almost impertinent to say of Professor Campbell Fraser that, in this work, he speaks out of the abundance of his knowledge as well as out of the fulness of his heart. For, as all know, there is no living authority better equipped than he for the task of viewing the problems of the present in the light of the past ; and there is certainly none who brings to that task a more earnest devotion to truth or a greater measure of philosophic moderation. But, while it may seem needless to speak of Professor Fraser in this way, the fact thus expressed adds a peculiar interest to this, his latest work ; for, instead of giving his great subject a historical treatment, he deliberately aims at dealing with what he justly calls "the supreme human question—Are religious beliefs, or any of them, true?" This is a question which the instructed mind that has mastered many systems and sympathized with every philosophic mood too often shrinks from facing. Abundance of knowledge seems to destroy, only too frequently, that intellectual nerve which is necessary for decision. There is, therefore a peculiar interest attaching to the deliberate and positive conclusions of a mind which for half a century has been following the course of modern thought and pondering the wisdom of the ages.

Professor Fraser approaches his subject by what seems to the English reader the most natural way, that indicated by the profes-